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TERMINATING SOCIAL SECURITY
DISABILITY BENEFITS: ANOTHER BURDEN
FOR THE DISABLED?
I. Introduction
Between March, 1981, and September, 1983, more than 374,000
people were removed from the Social Security disability benefit rolls.
Recent procedural changes which the Reagan Administration has in-
troduced for terminating Social Security disability benefits have add-
ed uncertainty to the lives of thousands of physically and mentally
disabled individuals. 2 A recipient of disability benefits can no longer
be certain that his or her benefits will continue for the duration of the
disability.
The Social Security Act3 (the Act) never provided that an individual,
once found to be disabled4 and thus entitled to receive benefits,
necessarily retains the right to continue collecting those benefits for life.
The Act and the Regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Health
and Human Services5 (the Secretary) contemplate periodic investiga-
1. N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1983, at A18, col. 1. The two types of benefits for which
disabled persons may qualify under the Social Security Act are Social Security Disability
(SSD) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). 42 U.S.C. §§ 423, 1382 (1976). SSI
eligibility depends upon financial need while SSD eligibility does not. Id. However,
since this distinction is not significant for the purposes of this Note, which deals with
termination procedures governing both types of benefits, only the words "disability
benefits" will be used.
2. For a discussion of these changes, see infra text accompanying notes 10-15.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397 (1976).
4. According to the Act, "disabled" means "inability to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impair-
ment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected
to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months ..... Id. § 423(d)(1)(A).
[A]n individual.., shall be determined to be under a disability only if his
physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he
is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age,
education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial
gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether
such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific
job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for
work.
Id. § 423(d)(2)(A).
5. When Congress redesignated the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
as the Department of Health and Human Services in 1980, the Act's reference to the
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare was changed to refer to the Secretary of
Health and Human Services. See 20 U.S.C. § 3508 (Supp. V 1981). The Act gives the
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tions6 of beneficiaries' continuing eligibility and, where appropriate,
termination of benefits. 7
Prior to 1980, however, the provisions in the Act and Regulations
relating to continuing eligibility were vague.8 In the absence of fixed
statutory requirements, Social Security Administration officials ap-
parently relied on internal regulations concerning procedures for in-
vestigating possible ineligibility. 9 In 1980 a major change took place.
In response to a government study revealing that a significant percen-
tage of beneficiaries were not actually entitled to Social Security disabili-
ty payments,10 the Act was amended to provide for mandatory and fre-
Secretary full power and authority to make rules and regulations and establish pro-
cedures "not inconsistent" with the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(a) (1976). In fact, the
Act mandates the Secretary's adoption of reasonable and proper rules and regulations.
Id.
6. In particular, the Secretary's Regulations provide that:
An investigation will be started if-
(1) We [the Social Security Administration] need a current medical report
to see if you are able to do substantial gainful activity;
(2) You [the recipient] return to work and successfully complete a period
of trial work;
(3) Substantial earnings are reported to your wage record;
(4) You tell us that you have recovered from your disability or that you have
returned to work; or
(5) Your State Vocational Rehabilitation Agency tells us that-
(i) You have completed your training;
(ii) You have returned to work;
(iii) You are able to return to work; or
(6) Someone in a position to know of your physical or mental condition tells
us that you are not disabled or that you have returned to work and it ap-
pears that the report could be substantially correct.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1590(b) (1983).
7. Id. §§ 404.1594, .1597.
8. See H.R. REP. No. 944, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1980). The report indicates
that administrative procedures only provided for continuing eligibility investigations
under a limited number of circumstances, such as when there was a reasonable expec-
tation that the beneficiary would show medical improvement. Id.
9. United States General Accounting Office, Release on Social Security Administra-
tion's Program For Reviewing The Continuing Eligibility of Disabled Persons 2-3 (Ju-
ly 14, 1982) [hereinafter cited as GAO Release] (statement of Gregory J. Ahart, Direc-
tor, Human Resources Division) (discusses the established medical examination diary
process which involved designating future medical reexamination dates for beneficiaries
with conditions believed to be highly likely to improve). See also The Comptroller
General's Report to Congress, More Diligent Followup Needed to Weed Out Ineligi-
ble SSA Disability Beneficiaries 3, 25 (March 31, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Comptroller
General's Report].
10. Letter from Gregory J. Ahart, Director of Human Resources Division of the
U.S. General Accounting Office to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
(April 18, 1978) (outlines results of GAO study). See also Comptroller General's Report,
supra note 9, at 5-12.
[Vol. XII
1983] DISABILITY BENEFITS TERMINATION
quent review of all but a very narrow class of individuals receiving
benefits. " The amendment, which mandates a minimum of one review
every three years, was to become effective on January 1, 1982.12
The Reagan Administration acted swiftly, however, and the new ac-
celerated continuing disability investigations were under way ten
months ahead of schedule in March of 1981.13 Between March 1, 1981,
and March 31, 1982, the Social Security Administration selected ap-
proximately 368,500 cases for investigation compared with the 100,000
cases reviewed in 1980. 14 Of 748,000 beneficiaries investigated in 1981
and 1982, 340,000 have had their benefits terminated.' 5
The fairness of many of these termination decisions has been ques-
tioned. 16 There has been extensive media coverage of mentally 7 and
11. 42 U.S.C. § 421(h) (Supp. V 1981). The amended section reads:
In any case where an individual is or has been determined to be under a
disability, the case shall be reviewed by the applicabl State agency or the
Secretary (as may be appropriate), for purposes of continuing eligibility,
at least once every 3 years; except that where a finding has been made that
such disability is permanent, such review shall be made at such times as
the Secretary determines to be appropriate. Review of cases under the
preceding sentence shall be in addition to, and shall not be considered as
a substitute for, any other reviews which are required or provided for under
or in the administration of this subchapter.
Id. For a discussion of what constitutes a "permanent" disability within the meaning
of this section, see D. KEENAN & C. ASHMAN, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS 58-9,
n.2 (1983).
It should be noted that the Social Security Administration administers disability
benefit programs in conjunction with state agencies pursuant to sections 421 and 1383b
of the Act.
12. See Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-265, § 311,
94 Stat. 441, 460 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 421(h) (Supp. IV 1980)).
13. See Social Security Disability: The Effects of the Accelerated Review: Joint
Hearing Before the Special Subcomm. on Aging and the Subcomm. on Civil Service,
Post Office, and General Services of the Comm. on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Joint Hearing on the Effects of the
Accelerated Review] (opening statement of Senator David Pryor); see also N.Y. Times,
June 7, 1983, at Al, col. 3; May 9, 1982, § 1, at 1, col. 1, at 22, col. 1.
14. GAO Release, supra note 9, at 4; Joint Hearing on the Effects of the Accelerated
Review, supra note 13, at 3.
15. N.Y. Times, April 10, 1983, § 1, at 36, col. 4.
16. See Social Security Reviews of the Mentally Disabled: Hearings Before the
Special Subcomm. on Aging, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3, 113-15 (1983) [hereinafter cited
as Hearings on Social Security Reviews of the Mentally Disabled] (statements of Senator
John Heinz); id. at 66-75 (statement of Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General of
Maryland); id. at 86-91 (statements of Cesar Perales, Commissioner of New York State
Department of Social Services); id. at 101-12 (statements of Dr. Arthur T. Myerson,
American Psychiatric Association); Give the Disabled a Grandfather, N.Y. Times, Oct.
18, 1983, at A30, col. 1; Fairness of Reagan's Cutoffs of Disability Aid Questioned,
N.Y. Times, May 9, 1982, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
17. Between January 1, 1981, and August 31, 1982, reviews of mentally disabled
recipients constituted 27.5 % of all continuing disability investigations. Although the
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physically disabled individuals who have died while fighting for
reinstatement of terminated benefits.18 New York City Council Presi-
dent Carol Bellamy concludes that an overriding concern for cutting
or shifting costs has led to a federal policy of terminating benefits of
the truly disabled."'
Removing large numbers of disabled individuals from the disability
rolls20 shifts the responsibility for their care from the federal to the
percentage of individuals who receive benefits on the basis of a mental disability is
not known, it is estimated that 11% to 18 % of Social Security beneficiaries' primary
disability is a mental impairment. Hearings on Social Security Reviews of the Mental-
ly Disabled, supra note 16, at 164-65. The special problems faced by mentally disabl-
ed beneficiaries are also discussed. Id. at 101-12 (statements of Dr. Arthur T. Myerson).
18. See Work or Die, N.Y. Times, May 23, 1983, at A18, col. 1; The Disability
Nightmare, Newsday, March 22, 1983, at R1 (profiles cases of several individuals who
died while appealing termination decisions). A television program ontitled "Who
Decides Disability?" was broadcast on Public Broadcasting Service in New York on
June 20, 1983. Interviews with surviving spouses of terminated beneficiaries were
highlighted, as were discussions with Social Security Administration officials and
numerous state and federal government officials. See Transcript, Who Decides Disabili-
ty?, Frontline #121, 1983 (available in Fordham Law School Library).
19. Hearings on Social Security Reviews of the Mentally Disabled, supra note 16,
at 94 (prepared statement of Carol Bellamy, New York City Council President).
Despite this criticism, the Secretary of Health and Human Services recently com-
mented on the accelerated review program:
It's not a revenue issue. It is a people issue, a fairness issue, an equity issue.
It is also an issue that [this is] ... a program that is costing $18 billion that
became very loose in the 70s, according to the [Government Accounting Of-
fice] and the Carter Administration, a program that required review.
Transcript, Who Decides Disability?, supra note 18, at 29.
Amendments to the Social Security Act which were passed in January, 1983, were
apparently instituted to counteract some of the harsh effects of the 1980 amendment.
1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4377, 4384 (additional views of Senator Long
on H.R. 7093). The Amendments (1) provide for the continuation of disability payments
through the appeals process, subject to the government's collection if the ultimate deci-
sion is to terminate benefits and (2) give the Secretary authority, on a state-by-state
basis, to decrease the flow of cases sent to state agencies for review of continuing eligibil-
ity. Pub. L. No. 97-455, 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS (96 Stat.) 2498-99. The
Secretary is authorized to slow reviews only in states that demonstrate a good faith
effort to meet staffing requirements and process claims. Id. at 2499. The amendments
require the Secretary to present semiannual reports to the Senate Finance Committee
and the House Ways and Means Committee, showing how many eligibility reviews,
termination decisions and reconsideration requests were overturned at the reconsidera-
tion or hearing level. Id. at 2500-01. See also 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 421(h)(2), (3), 423(g)
(West Supp. 1983).
There is little if any indication, however, that these amendments have actually made
the continuing disability investigation process more of a "people" and "equity" issue
and less of a revenue issue. For a discussion of reforms which are currently being
urged, see infra notes 134-41 and accompanying text; see also U.S. Plans to Ease Disabil-
ity Criteria in Social Security, N.Y. Times, June 7, 1983, at Al, col. 3.
20. The overwhelming frequency with which termination decisions are reversed
on appeal demonstrates that many of those individuals whose benefits are terminated
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municipal level. At April, 1983, hearings before the Special Committee
on Aging, New York City Council President Bellamy commented on
the increased burdens which cities and states suffer as a result of the
Reagan Administration's termination policy.2 1 The Council President
pointed to increased expenditures for home relief and legal represen-
tation. 22 In addition, the City is faced with the problem of more
homeless people who turn to the streets.23
Other cities and states share these concerns, particularly with respect
to the mentally disabled. Philadelphia and Pennsylvania officials
estimate that the cost of general assistance, medical assistance, mental
health services and home care for many of the recipients terminated
from the disability rolls between March, 1981, and August, 1982, was
at least ten million dollars .24 A Michigan report projected that states
could expect the number of recipients of general assistance and aid to
families with dependent children to increase by approximately 730,000
are still in fact disabled. 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4373, 4377 (legislative
history of Public Law Number 97-455, 97th Congress, 2d Session) (on appeal, benefits
are reinstated by Administrative Law Judge in 65% of cases); N.Y. Times, Aug. 7,
1983, at 29, col. 1 (in New York, benefits are reinstated for 50% of appellants and
for 85 % of appellants who are represented by counsel); see also Joint Hearing on the
Effects of the Accelerated Review, supra note 13, at 5.
The four steps of the appeals process are as follows: (1) an application for recon-
sideration; (2) a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge; (3) an appeal to the
Social Security Administration Appeals Council; and (4) an action in federal district
court. See generally 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.907-.983 (1983) (detailed discussion of appeals
process). It seems likely that the complicated nature of the 12 to 18 month appeals
process prevents many disabled individuals whose benefits are terminated from pur-
suing their claims. Joint Hearing on the Effects of the Accelerated Review, supra note
13, at 3, 5.
21. See Hearings on Social Security Reviews of the Mentally Disabled, supra note
16, at 91-101. According to the Council President, "[w]hat began as a laudable effort
to insure the proper expenditure of [f]ederal dollars has instead become a ploy to shift
responsibility and program costs from the Federal Government to States and localities."
Id. at 95.
22. Id. at 95-96; Office of the City Council President, Passing the Buck: Federal
Efforts to Abandon the Mentally Disabled 1 (Jan. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Passing
the Buck]. See also Legal Aid Measure to Help Disabled, N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1983,
§ 1, at 29, col. 1 (bill signed by Governor Cuomo allocates up to $1 million for legal
representation for disabled whose benefits have been terminated).
23. See Hearings on Social Security Reviews of the Mentally Disabled, supra note
16, at 95; Passing the Buck, supra note 22, at 2.
In July, 1983, Council President Bellamy estimated that at least 50,000 New York
City residents are in danger of losing benefits at a potential cost of $75 million to the
City and State. Release from President of the Council, City of New York (July 22, 1983).
24. Hearings on Social Security Reviews of the Mentally Disabled, supra note 16,
at 253. See generally id. at 252-56 (report discusses financial impact on Pennsylvania
and Philadelphia of terminations and denials of disability benefits).
25. Id. at 280. See generally id. at 279-331 (report discusses how and why the Social
Security Administration has reduced the number of disability benefit recipients).
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persons nationwide. 25 According to the report, if the current termina-
tion policy continues, Michigan will be called upon to replace $123
million in benefit payments "which should rightfully be paid from
federal monies. 26
II. Burden of Proof in Termination Proceedings
The increased number of individuals whose cases are reviewed,2 7 and
who will ultimately have their benefits terminated, 28 accentuates the
need to consider what occurs after the Secretary determines that a
beneficiary is ineligible for continued benefit payments.2 9 It is unclear
whether it is the claimant 30 who must prove that he or she continues
to be disabled or the Secretary who must prove that the claimant is
no longer eligible for benefits. 3'
A. Alternative Approaches
The burden of proof question in Social Security disability cases has
been referred to as "elusive" 32 and "confusing." 33 The non-adversarial
26. Id. at 291. The report was prepared by the State of Michigan Interagency Task
Force on Disability.
State and local government officials are not alone in criticizing the federal govern-
ment's termination policy for its cost shifting. Recently, a Minnesota district court stated:
"There is no public interest in shifting financial responsibility for the psychiatrically
disabled from a solvent disability fund to state and local government." Mental Health
Ass'n of Minnesota v. Schweiker, 554 F. Supp. 157, 167 (D. Minn. 1982). Similarly,
the Ninth Circuit has acknowledged that termination of benefits causes "a shift of the
welfare burden from one program to another, from primarily federal to primarily state
sources of funds." Leschniok v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 520, 524 (9th Cir. 1983).
27. It is estimated that the rate of review will increase by more than 500% from
1980 to 1984. Release from President of the Council, City of New York (January 21,
1982). For statistics on past reviews, see supra text accompanying notes 14 and 15.
28. For statistics on past terminations, see supra text accompanying note 15.
29. The procedures to be followed after the Secretary has made a determination
that an individual's disability has ended are outlined in 20 C.F.R. § § 404.1594, .1595,
.1.597 (1983). Generally, the Secretary has a duty to contact the recipient and to allow
him or her to explain why benefits should not be stopped. Lack of cooperation in sup-
plying information about one's disability is grounds for stopping payments. Id. §
404.1594(a).
30. The term "claimant" refers to the plaintiff in Social Security proceedings.
31. In Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the Court stated that claimants
in disability cases bear "the continuing burden" of showing that they are disabled.
Id. at 336. Although this statement was dictum, the Matthews decision is often cited
for the proposition that the claimant in a termination proceeding bears the burden
of proving continuing disability. For examples of cases which cite Matthews in this
capacity, see Torres v. Schweiker, 682 F.2d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 823 (1983); Schauer v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 55, 58 (2d Cir. 1982); Gonzalez
v. Harris, 631 F.2d 143, 145 (9th Cir. 1980). But see Cassiday v. Schweiker, 663 F.2d
745, 749 (7th Cir. 1981) (Secretary burdened with justifying termination of benefits).
32. See Schauer, 675 F.2d at 57.
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nature of the proceedings is usually cited as the difficulty in applying
traditional burden of proof concepts.3 4 It is well settled, however, that
when a claimant seeks disability benefits for the first time, he bears
the burden of proving that his disability prevents him from returning
to his former occupation. 35 Once the claimant has met this burden,
the Secretary must prove "that there is some other type of substantial
gainful activity that the claimant can perform.- 36
When termination of benefits is considered, there is no established
rule regarding who bears the burden of proof. Three possible approaches
can be identified. First, eliminating the distinction between initial
disability determinations and termination proceedings for the purpose
of burden of proof questions would require a claimant who has already
proved his disability 7 to prove it again when the Secretary seeks to ter-
minate his benefits.3 8 Such a requirement attaches no presumption to
the initial determination of disability.
33. See Miranda v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 514 F.2d 996,
998 (1st Cir. 1975) ("[t]hese [burden of proof] responsibilities resist translation into
absolutes, especially because [S]ocial [S]ecurity proceedings are not strictly adversarial").
34. Id. See also Schauer, 675 F.2d at 57 (elusiveness stems from fact that Social
Security proceedings are not designed to be adversarial; Secretary is not even represented
by counsel); Northrup v. Schweiker, 561 F. Supp. 1240, 1242 (W.D.N.Y. 1983) (Social
Security proceedings are not strictly adversarial; burden of proof questions are con-
fusing and elusive).
35. See, e.g., Martin v. Harris, 666 F.2d 1153, 1155 (8th Cir. 1981) (individual
claiming disability benefits has burden of proving that medically determinable physical
or mental impairment precludes performance of prior work); Perez v. Schweiker, 653
F.2d 997, 999 (5th Cir. 1981) (burden in initial disability case is on claimant to prove
he can no longer perform prior occupation); Gonzalez v. Harris, 631 F.2d 143, 145
(9th Cir. 1980) (burden on claimant to establish that physical or mental impairment
prevents him from engaging in previous occupation); Parker v. Harris, 626 F.2d 225,
231 (2d Cir. 1980) (claimant establishes prima facie case by showing that he cannot
return to prior employment because of impairment); Hephner v. Matthews, 574 F.2d
359, 361 (6th Cir. 1978) (prima facie case established if claimant shows medical basis
for impairment that prevents him from engaging in his occupation); Gonzalez Perez
v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 572 F.2d 886, 887 (1st Cir. 1978) (to
qualify for disability benefits, plaintiff must meet initial burden of showing disability
that precludes return to former employment).
36. Martin, 666 F.2d at 1155. For similar descriptions of the Secretary's burden
of proof, see Perez, 653 F.2d at 999; Gonzalez, 631 F.2d at 145; Parker, 626 F.2d
at 231; Hephner, 574 F.2d at 362.
37. According to the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, the claimant's burden in an in-
itial determination case "is so stringent that it has been characterized as bordering on
the unrealistic." Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing
Williams v. Finch, 440 F.2d 613, 615 (5th Cir. 1971)).
38. For examples of cases which impose this "double burden," see Myers v. Richard-
son, 471 F.2d 1265, 1267 (6th Cir. 1972) (claimant in termination case bears burden
of establishing continuing disability); Marker v. Finch, 322 F. Supp. 905, 909-10 (D.
Del. 1971) (in termination proceeding, claimant has burden of proving continuation
of disability).
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A second approach gives weight to the initial disability determina-
tion by requiring the Secretary to prove that the claimant is no longer
disabled. 3 This designation of the burden of proof rests on the assump-
tion that the initial disability determination makes it very likely that
the claimant's disabling condition has persisted, and the Secretary must
therefore prove otherwise before terminating the claimant's benefits.
Finally, it is possible to favor the initial disability determination
without placing the entire burden on the Secretary. Imposing a
presumption of the continuation of the claimant's disabling condition
requires the Secretary to come forward with evidence, generally of a
recipient's improved condition. 40 Alternatively, such evidence might
demonstrate clear error in the initial disability determination4 or im-
provements in technology which enable the claimant to engage in
substantial gainful activity at the time of the review. 4 Despite the
Secretary's obligation to produce evidence under the presumption ap-
proach, the claimant may nevertheless be required to prove that he
is still disabled. 43 The presumption approach would affect the burden
of production without altering the underlying burden of proof.44
B. The Circuit Split
Circuit courts of appeals have addressed the burden of proof issue.
In Cassiday v. Schweiker,4s for example, the Seventh Circuit expressly
39. See Cassiday, 663 F.2d at 749 (Secretary is burdened party in termination pro-
ceeding). Other circuits have cited Cassiday as standing for the proposition that in
a termination proceeding, the Secretary bears the burden of proving that the claimant
is no longer disabled. See, e.g., Torres v. Schweiker, 682 F.2d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 823 (1983); Schauer, 675 F.2d at 58.
40. See Simpson v. Schweiker, 691 F.2d 966, 969 (11th Cir. 1982) (termination
proceeding should focus on whether claimant's condition is so improved that he is no
longer disabled).
41. See Musgrove v. Schweiker, 552 F. Supp. 104, 110-11 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (in ter-
mination proceeding where there is prior valid disability determination, claimant is
entitled to presumption of disability in absence of evidence amounting to showing of
either improvement in claimant's condition or clear error in prior disability determin-
ation).
42. See infra note 136 and accompanying text for discussion of bill which might
require such a showing before benefits may be terminated.
43. See Patti v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 582, 587 (9th Cir. 1982) ("when a claimant
is entitled to the benefit of a presumption that her disability still exists, the burden
is still on her to prove her case"). See also Musgrove, 552 F. Supp. at 106 (notwithstand-
ing the presumption, claimant has burden of proving case).
44. The burden of producing evidence must be distinguished from the burden of
proof. See Foundational Problems: Presumptions in the Context of Producing Evidence
and Burden of Persuasion in 1 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 66
(1977).
45. 663 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1981).
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stated that it is the Secretary who is "the burdened party" in a termina-
tion proceeding.46 The Sixth Circuit has stated that the burden of
establishing continuing disability is on the claimant. 47
The answers which other courts have provided to the burden of proof
question have been less precise. In Miranda v. Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare,4 the First Circuit held that both the claimant
and the Secretary have responsibilities in a termination proceeding.49
In particular, the Miranda court stated that the claimant must exer-
cise reasonable diligence in furnishing the Secretary with relevant
evidence,50 and that the Secretary's investigation of the claimant's
disability must be one which is not "wholly inadequate" under the
circumstances. 5' The court stressed that the Secretary may not terminate
benefits without substantial evidence52 to justify the termination.53 The
First Circuit explained that the Secretary's justification will normally
consist of current evidence of an improvement in the claimant's condi-
tion which enables him to engage in substantial gainful activity.5 Alter-
natively, the Secretary's evidence may show that the claimant's condi-
tion is not as serious as it was first believed to have been.5 5 Miranda,
46. Id. at 749.
47. See Myers v. Richardson, 471 F.2d 1265, 1267-68 (6th Cir. 1972). But see Hayes
v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 656 F.2d 204 (6th Cir. 1981). Hayes
indicates that a proper termination of benefits must rest on an improvement in the
claimant's condition. Id. at 206. Although Hayes thus suggests that the Sixth Circuit
may have deviated from the rigid rule it articulated in Myers, recent cases in other
circuits cite Myers as the Sixth Circuit rule. See, e.g., Schauer v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d
55, 58-59 (2d Cir. 1982); Northrup v. Schweiker, 561 F. Supp. 1240, 1242 (W.D.N.Y.
1983); Musgrove v. Schweiker, 552 F. Supp. 104, 112 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
48. 514 F.2d 996 (1st Cir. 1975).
49. Id. at 998.
50. Id. See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1588 (1983) (general obligation of beneficiary to
notify Secretary of improvement in condition or increase in earnings or work); id. §
404.1594 (following Secretary's determination that beneficiary is no longer disabled,
beneficiary may give reasons that benefits should not be stopped; failure to cooperate
in supplying information is grounds for stopping payments); id. § 404.1595(c) (addi-
tional or new information which beneficiary seeks to give Secretary in support of con-
tention that benefits should not be stopped is due within 10 days of receipt of notice
of termination).
51. See Miranda, 514 F.2d at 998.
52. On judicial review, the Secretary's factual findings are conclusive if supported
by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1976).
53. 514 F.2d at 998 ("once having found a disability, the Secretary may not ter-
minate the benefits without substantial evidence to justify so doing. ). Id. (em-
phasis added).
54. Id.
55. Id. The Miranda court rejected
the broad rule... that the Secretary cannot take into account medical
evidence considered earlier when the disability was first established. It would
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often cited for the proposition that the burden of proof in a termina-
tion case is on the Secretary, 6 appears to suggest that the Secretary
has at least the primary responsibility of coming forth with evidence
justifying the decision to terminate the claimant's benefits.5 7 The claim-
ant must cooperate, however, by supplying the Secretary with rele-
vant evidence.58
In Benko v. Schweiker,59 the district court of New Hampshire dis-
cussed the Miranda criteria for justifying termination decisions.60
Although the Benko court expressly agreed that the Secretary's show-
ing of an improved condition would constitute grounds for terminating
benefits,6 ' it qualified its acceptance of reassessment of the claimant's
condition as discussed by the Miranda court.6 2 The Benko court stated
that res judicata prevents the Secretary from terminating benefits on
the ground that the claimant's impairment is not as serious as was first
believed, unless there is (1) an affirmative showing that the impair-
ment was difficult to diagnose 3 and (2) new and material evidence
demonstrating the condition to be less severe than originally thought.6 4
According to the Benko court, if these two requirements are not met,
be wrong for the Secretary to terminate an earlier finding of disability on
no basis other than his reappraisal of the earlier evidence. However, many
impairments are difficult to diagnose; a proper disagnosis may require a
reference to the cumulative medical history. The Secretary may grant a
disability on the basis of a subjective complaint and tentative diagnosis pen-
ding the accumulation over time of sufficient indicia for a more complete
evaluation. At a termination hearing, the Administrative Law Judge may
appropriately contrast the relative strength or weakness of earlier medical
evidence and relevant earlier events with claimant's current condition.
Id. The Eighth Circuit is in accord. See Weber v. Harris, 640 F.2d 176, 178-79 (8th
Cir. 1981); Brissette v. Schweiker, 566 F. Supp. 626, 633 (D. Mo. 1983).
56. Torres v. Schweiker, 682 F.2d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 823 (1983); Schauer 675 F.2d at 58; Cassiday, 663 F.2d at 749.
57. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text. The" Secretary's duty to show
improvement or evidence that the claimant's condition is not as serious as was first
believed, as compared to the claimant's continuing responsibility to be diligent in fur-
nishing relevant evidence, suggests that it is the Secretary who has the "burden" of
coming forth with evidence. For a discussion of the imposition of a burden of produc-
tion on the Secretary, see infra text accompanying notes 74-94.
58. 514 F.2d at 998.
59. 551 F. Supp. 698 (D.N.H. 1982).
60. Id. at 702.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. The difficulty in diagnosis, stated the Benko court, "must not be related
to some factor, such as consultative examinations or clinical testing, over which the
Secretary has control. It must be predicated on some factor inherent in the disease,
rather than in the administrative process." 551 F. Supp. at 702 (citations omitted).
64. Id.
1983] DISABILITY BENEFITS TERMINATION
an improvement in the recipient's condition must be shown.65 The First
Circuit may adopt Benko's standards, or it may continue to adhere to
the more easily satisfied requirements set forth eight years ago in
Miranda.
Just as the Miranda court resisted "deciding abstractly" who bears
the burden of proof in a termination proceeding, 6 the Second Circuit
expressly declined to rule on the issue in Schauer v. Schweiker.67 The
Schauer court noted, however, that two district court cases in the Sec-
ond Circuit support the proposition that the Secretary is not the burden-
ed party.6 8 In discussing the split among the circuit courts of appeals,
the court further observed that none of the courts that have placed the
burden on the claimant have done so in a holding.6 . Reiterating its
reluctance to decide unnecessarily the burden of proof issue, the Schauer
court cautiously concluded that, "notwithstanding the various courts'
statements, we are unaware of any case in which the Secretary's ter-
65. Id. The Benko court is not alone in expressing concern about the statement
in Miranda that a termination may be based upon the fact that the claimant's condi-
tion is not as serious as was first supposed. In Shaw v. Schweiker, 536 F. Supp. 79
(E. D. Pa. 1982), the court stated that "it is logically impossible for a claimant to become
non-disabled without a change amounting to improvement .... Id. at 82. The Shaw
court then stated that Miranda's sanction of terminations based upon evidence that
the condition is less serious than first supposed must be interpreted to "pertain only
to situations involving newly discovered evidence or a clearly erroneous interpretation
of evidence in the initial granting of benefits." Id. According to the court, a contrary
reading would permit redeterminations of issues already resolved. Id. See also Simp-
son v. Schweiker, 691 F.2d 966, 969 & n.2 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing Shaw for proposi-
tion that terminations not based on showing of improvement or newly discovered
evidence violate res judicata); Musgrove, 552 F. Supp. at 106 (termination of benefits
without showing of improvement or newly discovered evidence constitutes an "im-
permissible relitigation of facts and determinations already finally decided").
66. 514 F.2d at 998.
67. 675 F.2d at 59. Because Schauer was not a termination case, the court did not
have to affirmatively decide where it stood in relation to "the apparently confused
state of the law as to who bears the burden in a termination case." Id.
68. Id. at 58. The two cases were Magee v. Califano, 494 F. Supp. 162, 166
(W.D.N.Y. 1980) (claimant has burden of proving disability in first instance and "must
shoulder the same burden of persuasion when challenging a termination of benefits
granted previously..."), and Memoli v. Califano, 463 F. Supp. 578, 582 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (claimant bears continuing burden of proving disability).
69. 675 F.2d at 58-9. The Schauer court cited Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(question was proper timing of termination proceeding); Crosby v. Schweiker, 650
F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1981) (substantial evidence supported finding that claimant's disabil-
ity had ended); Magee, 494 F. Supp. 162 (claimant satisfied burden and should therefore
continue to receive benefits); Memoli, 463 F. Supp. 578 (appeal from initial denial
on ground that end date was erroneous); Myers, 471 F.2d 1265 (same); Marker v. Finch,
322 F. Supp. 905 (D. Del. 1971) (substantial evidence supported finding that claimant's
disability had ended).
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mination of benefits previously awarded has been upheld in the absence
of substantial evidence that the recipient's disability had ended.
'
"
70
A year after Schauer was decided, the burden of proof issue was ad-
dressed by the Western District of New York in Northrup v. Schweiker.
71
Acknowledging the lack of uniformity among the circuit courts of ap-
peals, the Northrup court expressed its preference for a rule that would
give some weight to the Secretary's original finding that the claimant
was disabled. 72 The district court held that the Secretary bears the
burden of coming forth with relevant evidence of a change in the claim-
ant's condition.73
This view, most clearly articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Patti v.
Schweiker,74 presumes an ongoing disability. 75 The presumption im-
poses "on the party against whom it is directed the burden of going
forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption. "76 Yet in spite
of the reference to the Secretary as the burdened party, 77 the rule means
only that in the absence of proof to the contrary, claimant's condition
is presumed to continue. 7 The presumption affects only the burden
of coming forward with evidence. 79 It does not change the ultimate
burden of proof which, according to the Ninth Circuit, remains on the
claimant.80
70. 675 F.2d at 59.
71. 561 F. Supp. 1240 (W.D.N.Y. 1983).
72. Id. at 1242 ("I cannot turn a blind eye to the Secretary's original finding that
Ms. Northrup was disabled").
73. Id. The court stated that
[d]isability, once determined, cannot be reversed without the Secretary mak-
ing clear findings based upon relevant evidence of changes which have oc-
curred in the claimant's condition. Without stating the reasons for chang-
ing its position, the assumption is that there is no new evidence of any change
in the claimant's condition. For that reason, the Secretary has the burden
of coming forth with relevant evidence of changes in the claimant's condi-
tion - not merely the re-evaluation of stale evidence already in the clai-
mant's file.
Id.
74. 669 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1982).
75. "We are unable to discern any reason why the familiar principle that a condi-
tion, once proved to exist, is presumed to continue to exist, should not be applied when
disability benefits are at stake." Id. at 587 (citing Rivas v. Weinberger, 475 F.2d 255,
258 (5th Cir. 1973)). For a general discussion of the presumption of continuity, see
L. HAMMON, HAMMON ON EVIDENCE 145-46 (1907).
76. 669 F.2d at 587 (quoting Rule 301 of Federal Rules of Evidence).
77. 669 F.2d at 586-87.
78. Id. at 586 (citing Rivas, 475 F.2d at 258).
79. 669 F.2d at 587.
80. Id. Accord Iida v. Heckler, 705 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1983); Dotson v. Schweiker,
UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH) 14,803 (4th Cir. Oct. 6, 1983).
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In accordance with this Ninth Circuit view, the Eleventh Circuit
in Simpson v. Schweiker8l explained that although in an initial disability
case the sole question on appeal is whether the Secretary's finding is
supported by substantial evidence, 2 in a termination situation the prin-
ciples of res judicata dictate a different inquiry.8 3 In particular, the
Simpson court stated that the relevant question is whether there is
substantial evidence to support "improvement [in the claimant's con-
dition] to the point of no disability .... ',84 The Eleventh Circuit em-
braced the presumption of ongoing disability,8 5 but maintained that
the ultimate burden of proof remains on the claimant. 86 The Simpson
court concluded:
If... the evidence in a continuation case is substantially the same as
the evidence had been in the initial disability benefits request case,
benefits must be continued. Otherwise, termination of benefits will
often depend not on a finding of changed condition, but simply on
the whim of a changed [Administrative Law Judge].87
In September, 1982, in Musgrove v. Schweiker,88 the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania adopted a presumption of ongoing disability 9 not-
withstanding Torres v. Schweiker, 0 a Third Circuit case explicitly
stating that the burden of proof in a termination proceeding is on the
claimant.91 Significantly, the Musgrove court explained that imposing
81. 691 F.2d 966 (11th Cir. 1982).
82. Id. at 969.
83. 691 F.2d at 969 (citing Shaw, 536 F. Supp. 79). For a discussion of Shaw, see
supra note 65.
84. 691 F.2d at 969 (emphasis in original). Although it is not clear whether the
Simpson court completely rejected the possibility that a termination may properly be
based on a finding that the claimant's condition is not as serious as was first thought,
it appears likely that the Eleventh Circuit will require at least a showing of newly
discovered evidence.
85. 691 F.2d at 969.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 552 F. Supp. 104.
89. Id. at 106. In adopting the presumption approach, the Musgrove court stated
that such a view was consistent with both Miranda and an earlier district court case,
Shaw v. Schweiker, discussed supra at note 65.
90. 682 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 823 (1983).
91. 552 F. Supp. at 111. When the Musgrove decision was first written, the opin-
ion in Torres had not been issued. Musgrove, 552 F. Supp. at 111.
In Torres, the Third Circuit gave three reasons for adopting the view that the burden
of proof in termination proceedings is on the claimant. 682 F.2d at 111. First, the Torres
court found support for such a view in the language of Matthews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319 (1976). See supra note 31. Second, the court found support in the language
of the Act. 682 F.2d at 111 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5) (1976)) (individual shall not
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a presumption of continuing disability is not inconsistent with impos-
ing a burden of proof on the claimant, the view set forth by the Third
Circuit in Torres.2 Elaborating on the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits'
discussions of the relationship between the presumption and the overall
burden of proof,93 the district court emphasized that the presumption
ceases to have any effect once the Secretary comes forth with persuasive
evidence of either improvement of the claimant's condition or prior
error in the disability determination. 4
Eleven months after Musgrove was decided, the Third Circuit again
addressed the question of the burden of proof in termination cases in
Kuzmin v. Schweiker.95 In Kuzmin, the Third Circuit adopted a
presumption approach, pointing to principles of fairness and the need
for consistency in the administrative process.16 The presumption as ar-
be considered disabled unless he furnishes medical and other evidence as required by
the Secretary). But see infra notes 110-16 and accompanying text for the view that the
Act and Regulations support the presumption approach. Third, the Torres court reason-
ed that although considerations of fairness and policy require the Secretary to bear
the burden of introducing evidence when it is easier for him to do so, no such con-
siderations are present in the context of termination proceedings. 682 F.2d at 112. There
is no discussion in Torres about what consideration, if any, is to be given to the fact
that the claimant was once determined to be disabled.
In Musgrove, subsequent to the issuance of the Torres opinion, the Secretary
moved for relief contending that Torres precluded adoption of the presumption ap-
proach. The Musgrove court concluded that the two decisions were "not inconsistent"
and reaffirmed the presumption of ongoing disability. 552 F. Supp. at 111.
92. 552 F. Supp. at 111.
93. Both Patti and Simpson held that (a) there is a presumption of ongoing disability
and (b) the ultimate burden of proof remains on the claimant. See supra notes 79-80
and 85-86 and accompanying text.
94. 552 F. Supp. at 111-12. Accurd Coia v. Heckler, 567 F. Supp. 301, 303 (E.D.
Pa. 1983). Having explained that a presumption does not alter the underlying burden
of proof, the Musgrove court added that
without substantial evidence of the termination of appellant's disability, i.e.,
improvement, or a showing of error in the initial determination of disabili-
ty, the termination of benefits by the Secretary must of necessity be based
on whim, caprice, or an impermissible relitigation of facts and conclusions
already finally decided.
552 F. Supp. at 112 (emphasis in original).
95. See Kuzmin v. Schweiker, No. 82-5705, slip op. (3d Cir. Aug. 18, 1983)
[hereinafter cited as Kuzmin, slip op.]. Although Kuzmin involved payment of benefits
for a closed period, the court explained that the case "raises an important legal issue
as to the standard to be applied when disability termination is at issue." Id. at 6.
96. Id. at 8. The Kuzmin court explained that both the appearance and fact of
consistency in the administrative process are important. It added that a presumption
approach "will help avoid the disconcerting picture presented by the triple ad-
ministrative flip flop in this case." Id. Presumably, the court was referring to the fact
that the claimant was initially found disabled, subsequently notified that her disabil-
ity had ceased and then found disabled again. Id. at 4-6.
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ticulated by the Kuzmin court, however, does not operate until the
claimant has introduced some evidence that his impairment remains
essentially unchanged. 7 The court indicated that the claimant's duty
to produce evidence would be easily fulfilled.9 8 For example, claimants
can introduce evidence from previous disability determinations sup-
plemented by their own testimony as to the continuing nature of their
condition.19 Having produced this evidence, the court concluded that
a claimant would be entitled to the benefit of a presumption of contin-
uing disability.I°0 This presumption, which does not alter the underlying
burden of proof, imposes the burden of coming forward with evidence
on the Secretary. 101
Although the practical effect of the Third Circuit's modified presump-
tion approach might not differ from the effect of the full presumption
approach embraced by the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits,102 the Third
Circuit's approach requires the initial burden of production to be met
by the claimant.10 3 Kuzmin does not suggest, however, that the
97. Id. at 8.
98. Id. at 9. The Kuzmin court explained that claimants are likely to remain under
medical care and stated that requiring the claimant to introduce evidence "should not
impose any undue hardship." Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 8.
101. Id.
102. For discussions of the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits' full presumption approaches,
see supra text accompanying notes 74-87.
103. Kuzmin, slip op., supra note 95, at 8-9. The court noted that the presumption
approach which it adopted differs from the full presumption approach in Patti, which
does not require the claimant to come forth with evidence in order to. be entitled to
a presumption of ongoing disability. Id. at 8-9. Two rationales were offered for adopt-
ing a modified presumption approach. First, the Kuzmin court stated that there was
a distinction to be made between the existence of a medical condition and the existence
of a statutory disability, because
[t]here is no policy reason to presume the continuation of a medical condi-
tion. Since such conditions may and do change, no consideration of ad-
ministrative consistency is implicated. On the other hand, the Secretary's
prior determination that a particular medical condition has resulted in a
statutory disability does implicate administrative consistency.
Id. at 9. Second, the Kuzmin court stated that a presumption of a continuing disabil-
ity was precluded by its earlier holding in Torres v. Schweiker. Id. See discussion of
Torres, supra note 91. The court's attempt to distinguish between presuming the con-
tinuance of a condition and presuming the continuance of a disability seems illogical.
Any condition which is presumed to continue for purposes of applying the full Patti
presumption is by definition one which was found to constitute a statutory disability.
Perhaps the Kuzmin court was simply resisting imposing a presumption in cases where
a claimant might not attempt to show that his condition has persisted. It appears,
however, that appeals by this type of claimant would be rare. As to the court's con-
cern about the implications of Torres, it should be noted that the Musgrove decision
1983]
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Musgrove court's reasoning as to the consistency between a full presump-
tion and an underlying burden of proof on the claimant was infirm. 
1 04
The Fifth Circuit demonstrated in Crosby v. Schweiker01" that a full
presumption of ongoing disability is consistent with a burden of proof
on the claimant. 06 Although it expressed doubt that "traditional con-
cepts of burden of proof" have a place in Social Security appeals,
10 7
the Crosby court agreed with the Sixth Circuit rule that the claimant
bears the burden in termination proceedings. 108 Nevertheless, the court
maintained that such a position did not conflict with the general Fifth
Circuit rule that, in the absence of proof to the contrary, a claimant's
disability is presumed to continue.109
III. The Secretary's View on Burdens
A. Statutory Guidance
Although the Act and the Secretary's Regulations lack specific
guidelines regarding burden of proof and presumption issues, it is well
settled that the Act is remedial and beneficent in nature 10 since it is
designed to aid the disabled. In addition, the Regulations governing
procedures to be followed by the Secretary in terminating benefits 1'
are consistent with the presumption of ongoing disability approach.
persuasively showed the compatibility of the Torres holding with the full presump-
tion of ongoing disability.
104. For a discussion of the Musgrove court's reasoning, see supra notes 91-94 and
accompanying text.
105. 650 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1981).
106. Id. at 778.
107. Id.
108. Id. (citing Myers, 471 F.2d at 1286).
109. 650 F.2d at 778. The Crosby court cited Rivas, 475 F.2d at 258, for the pro-
position that once evidence has been presented in support of a finding that a condition
exists, it is presumed in the absence of proof to the contrary that such condition has
not changed. See Crosby, 650 F.2d at 778. The Rivas court cited Hall v. Celebrezze,
314 F.2d 686, 688 (6th Cir. 1963) and Prevette v. Richardson, 316 F. Supp. 144, 146
(D.S.C. 1970) for this proposition. Rivas, 475 F.2d at 258. Although the Fourth Cir-
cuit has applied the presumption of continuity to the context of disability termination
proceedings, the Sixth Circuit's position is unclear. See supra notes 47 and 80.
110. " 'The Social Security Act is a remedial statute to be broadly construed and
liberally applied.' " Gold v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 463 F.2d
38, 41 (2d Cir. 1972) (quoting Haberman v. Finch, 418 F.2d 664, 667 (2d Cir. 1969)).
For examples of cases which refer to the remedial nature of the Act, see Hankerson
v. Harris, 636 F.2d 893, 895 (2d Cir. 1980); Hess v. Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare, 497 F.2d 837, 840 (3d Cir. 1974); Martin v. Secretary of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare, 492 F. Supp. 459, 463 (D. Wyo. 1980); Reardon v. Weinberger,
387 F. Supp. 1210, 1212 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
111. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1595-1597 (1983).
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In fact, the language in the Regulations suggests such a presumption."12
The requirement that the Secretary's notification of the decision to ter-
minate benefits include a summary of the information upon which the
decision was based ' 13 indicates that the burden is on the Secretary to
come forth with evidence of a change in the recipient's condition. 114
This burden is the equivalent of a presumption of continuing disability.
The Regulations also permit the Secretary to reopen a case within
four years of the date of the notice of the initial determination where
good cause is shown. I Review of initial disability determinations must
occur within three years of the date of determination, ' 6 and the
Secretary'may reopen a case within four years to show that the deter-
mination was erroneous. Thus, the Secretary's decision not to reopen
implies that the initial determination was correct. The credence which
the Regulations lend to the Secretary's initial determination supports
a presumption of ongoing disability.
B. Non-acquiescence in the Presumption Approach
Despite judicial and statutory support for the presumption of ongo-
ing disability in termination reviews, the Social Security Administra-
112. See infra notes 113-16.
113. Id. at § 404.1595(b)(1). This section provides:
What the advance notice will tell you. We will give you a summary of the
information we have. We will also tell you why we have determined that
you are not now disabled, and we will give you a chance to reply. If it is
because of-
(1) Medical reasons. The advance notice will tell you what the medical
information in your file shows...
Id.
The Secretary is required to give advance notice unless the individual (1) requests
that his payments be stopped; (2) tells the Secretary that he is no longer disabled; or
(3) has previously been told by the Secretary that his benefits would stop. Id. §
404.1595(a),(d).
114. Presumably, the Secretary's summary of information and reasons for terminating
benefits is intended to consist of more than a reassessment of the information upon
which the initial finding of disability was based, since the claimant would already
have knowledge of that information.
115. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.988(b), .989(a)(1)-(a)(3) (1983). Good cause is said to
exist where (1) new and material evidence is supplied; (2) a clerical error was made
in computing benefits; or (3) evidence considered in making the initial determination
clearly shows on its face that an error was made. Id. at § 404.989(a)(1)-(a)(3). Although
good cause seems to be narrowly and strictly defined, it actually may be an easy stan-
dard to meet. In Lauritzen v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1975), the court
stated that the relevant question is whether an injustice has been done to the claimant
or whether there is a manifest error in the record. Id. at 563. See also Munsinger v.
Schweiker, 709 F.2d 1212, 1215-16 (8th Cir. 1983) (citing Lauritzen test with approval).
116. This procedure is mandated by the Social Security Disability Amendments of
1980. See supra notes 11 and 12 and accompanying text.
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tion remains opposed to this approach. The Administration officially
announced in 1982 that it did not acquiesce in the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion of Patti v. Schweiker.1 7 Rejecting the proposition that in a
termination proceeding the Secretary must show medical improvement
or other change," 8 the Administration criticized the Patti court for fail-
ing to adhere to a prior Social Security Ruling which rejected the
requirement that the Secretary show such improvement. 9 The Ad-
ministration stated, without specific reference, that other circuit courts
do not require a showing of improvement.12 0 The Social Security Ad-
ministration then directed that "Patti does not provide a judicial in-
terpretation of the disability regulations which should be followed."'121
IV. Forced Adoption of the Presumption Approach?
A. Judicial and State Agency Challenges to Non-acquiescence
The Social Security Administration's non-acquiescence has been
challenged. 122 On June 16, 1983, in Lopez v. Heckler,123 a California
district court granted relief to a Ninth Circuit class 24 by enjoining and
117. See S.S.R. 82-49C (Oct. 1982). Patti is discussed supra at text accompanying
notes 74-80.
The Social Security Administration also refused to acquiesce in Finnegan v. Mat-
thews, 641 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1981). See S.S.R. 82-IOC (Jan. 1982). The Finnegan
decision mirrors Patti, except that it involved a recipient of benefits under the "grand-
father clause" of the Act. The grandfather clause provides that an individual who is
disabled pursuant to certain approved state plans may be considered disabled within
the meaning of the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(E) (1976).
118. The Social Security Administration stated that "even if current medical or other
evidence does not show 'medical improvement' or other change, the disability of
a... recipient is subject to cessation if such evidence shows that the recipient is able
to engage in substantial gainful activity .... S.S.R. 82-49C (Oct. 1982).
119. Id. The Administration was referring to S.S.R. 81-6 (Jan. 1981) in which it
stated that in termination cases it is not necessary for the Secretary to show whether
or how much the individual's condition has improved. Id.
120. S.S.R. 82-49C (Oct. 1982).
121. Id.
122. See infra notes 123-28; see also Judge Orders Review of Disability Cuts in 9
States, N.Y. Times, June 19, 1983, § 1, at 19, col. 1.
123. No. 83 Civ. 0697 (C.D. Cal. June 16, 1983).
124. The Lopez court certified a class of plaintiffs who lived in the Ninth Circuit
and were Social Security disability benefits recipients who had been or would be con-
sidered for termination after August 30, 1981. Lopez, supra note 123, Memorandum
of Decision at 8. See also Trujillo v. Schweiker, 558 F. Supp. 1058, 1064 (D. Colo.
1983). The Trujillo court certified a class representing all Social Security disability
beneficiaries in Colorado
who have been or are receiving disability benefits and who have presented
a claim to the Secretary that their disabilities have continued and whose
entitlements have been terminated without the application of the improve-
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restraining the Secretary (1) from failing to "follow, implement or ac-
cord" precedential effect to Patti v. Schweiker12 5 and (2) from implemen-
ting the non-acquiescence policy contained in Social Security Rulings
pertaining to the Secretary's obligation to show an improvement or
change in the claimant's condition. 2 " Moreover, the Lopez court, ac-
cusing the Secretary of operating outside the law, ordered reinstate-
ment of benefits to a wide class of terminated beneficiaries. 127 The court
ment standard to their case, or who have been or may be terminated due
to the failure of the [Secretary] to give presumptive effect to the prior deter-
mination of disability.
Id. See infra note 128 for a further discussion of Trujillo.
125. Lopez, supra note 123, Order at 2.
126. Id. See also supra note 119.
127. In particular, the court ordered that within 60 days the Secretary notify each
class member who had been terminated after a certain date of his right to apply for
reinstatement if he believed there had not been a medical improvement in his condi-
tion following the granting of benefits. Lopez, supra note 123, Memorandum of Deci-
sion at 6; Order at 2-3. The Secretary was ordered to reinstate and pay benefits upon
receipt of applications for reinstatement. The amount to be paid was set at that which
the individuals would have received if their benefits had not been discontinued. Order
at 3.
On September 1, 1983, however, Supreme Court Justice William Rehnquist tem-
porarily postponed the effect of the Lopez court's order, stating that the government
need not restore benefits to members of the Ninth Circuit class, pending determina-
tion of the Secretary's appeal by the Ninth Circuit. Heckler v. Lopez, 52 U.S.L.W.
3187 (9th Cir. Sept. 9, 1983). See also N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1983, at A17, col. 1. Justice
Rehnquist's action came after the Ninth Circuit considered and denied the Secretary's
motion for a partial stay pending appeal of the preliminary injunction ordered by the
California district court. Noting that a restoration of benefits as required by the in-
junction could lead to the Secretary's being forced to give back benefits to between
28,000 and 78,000 individuals, the Ninth Circuit stated:
[p]laintiffs do not attempt to match in dollars and cents the monetary harms
that will allegedly be suffered by the government. Yet the physical and emo-
tional suffering shown by plaintiffs in the record before us is far more com-
pelling than the possibility of some administrative inconvenience or monetary
loss to the government. ... Faced with such a conflict between financial con-
cerns and preventable human suffering, we have little difficulty concluding
that the balance of hardships tips decidedly in plaintiffs' favor.
Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir. 1983). On October 11, 1983, the United
States Supreme Court denied an emergency application to vacate the stay entered by
Justice Rehnquist. Heckler v. Lopez, 52 U.S.L.W. 3288 (U.S. Oct. 11, 1983). Justice
Brennan, with whom Justice Marshall joined, dissented:
Any financial or administrative inconvenience suffered by the Secretary can-
not outweigh, or even approach, the human suffering that has been impos-
ed on those disabled recipients of Social Security benefits who have been
wrongfully terminated. And as the courts below noted, the potential pay-
ment of retroactive benefits after final decision in this case will do little to
compensate the recipients for their current deprivations.
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mandated that their cases be reviewed according to the "current law
and regulations."'' 2 8
Challenges to the Social Security Administration's non- acquiescence
in the presumption of ongoing disability have come from government
officials as well as benefit recipients. On July 22, 1983, New York State
Social Services Commissioner Cesar Perales ordered that no disabled
New Yorkers be removed from the disability rolls until the federal
government promulgates "appropriate" medical standards for assess-
ing whose benefits should be discontinued. 2 Mr. Perales challenged
the Social Security Administration's non-acquiescence policy and stated
that his department would continue to review cases as required by the
federal government but would not terminate benefits until proper stand-
ards are set. 30
Massachusetts, Arkansas, Kansas, West Virginia and North Carolina
have also protested the Social Security Administration's termination
policy.' 3' In September, 1983, North Carolina Governor James B. Hunt,
Jr. ordered a moratorium on removing recipients from the disability
rolls, except in cases involving fraud. 32 In Kansas, there will be a re-
128. Lopez, supra note 123, Order at 3-4.
In August, 1983, in Trujillo v. Heckler, 569 F. Supp. 631 (D. Colo. 1983), the District
Court of Colorado granted summary judgment in favor of the Trujillo class, discussed
supra at note 124. Having defined the improvement standard to include both (1)
material improvement in the claimant's condition and (2) newly discovered evidence
establishing that the prior determination of disability was clearly erroneous, the court
held that "benefits may not be terminated without showing that the recipient's medical
condition has improved." Id. at 631, n. 1, 636. The court acknowledged that its holding
was tantamount to imposition of a presumption of ongoing disability. Id. at 636.
129. New York Moves to Protect Disability Benefits, Newsday, July 27, 1983, at
54; State Orders Halt to Taking Disabled Off Welfare, N.Y. Times, July 23, 1983,
at 25, col. 4.
130. N.Y. Times, July 23, 1983, at 25, col. 4. Although Mr. Perales subsequently
received a letter from the Regional Commissioner of Social Security stating that New
York was not in compliance with federal law, no indication was given as to what ac-
tion, if any, the federal government might take. New York and Other States Defy U.S.
Rules for Disability Benefits, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1983, at Al, col. 3. It has been
suggested that the failure of federal officials to penalize states for deviating from the
federal rules is due to: (1) the awkwardness that would result from such action in view
of the Administration's pledge to be more humane and (2) the difficulty implicit in
upsetting the partnership that has existed between federal and state agencies in ad-
ministering the Social Security program over the years. Id.
131. New York and Other States Defy U.S. Rules for Disability Benefits, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 12, 1983, at Al, col. 3. See also The National Law Journal, Oct. 17, 1983, at
1, col. 1, at 30, cols. 2-3 (Alabama, Maryland and Virginia object to Administration's
termination policy).
132. N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1983, at Al, col. 3. Alabama has also declared a mora-
torium on benefit terminations. The National Law Journal, Oct. 17, 1983, at 30, cols.
2-3.
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examination of all cases in which benefits have been terminated in the
last year, and the "unreasonably strict" federal guidelines will no longer
be utilized. 133
B. Legislative Reform
Proposed legislative reform13 4 addresses the need in termination cases
for procedural guidelines which are both fair and administratively ef-
ficient. A bill referred to as the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform
Act of 1983 has been approved by the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee. 135 The bill would amend the Act to require termination of
benefits to be based on substantial evidence that: (1) the recipient's con-
dition has improved so that he or she can now engage in substantial
gainful activity; or (2) the recipient is the beneficiary of advances in
medical or vocational therapy or technology which enable him to engage
in substantial gainful activity regardless of the lack of improvement
in the condition; or (3) new or improved diagnostic techniques
demonstrate that the recipient's impairment is not as disabling as it
was thought to be at the time of the most recent disability
determination. 136 The bill further provides for continuation of benefits
during appeals, 137 establishment of an advisory council on the medical
aspects of disability 13 and a moratorium on mental impairment re-
views. 13
Another provision of the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform
Act of 1983 would end the Social Security Administration's policy on
non-acquiescence.140 The Administration would be statutorily required
133. N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1983, at Al, col. 3.
134. See H.R. 3755, 98th Cong., ist Sess. (1983).
135. See id. The bill was approved by the House Ways and Means Committee on
September 27, 1983. N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1983, at A20, col. 4.
136. See H.R. 3755, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. § 101 (1983). The section further provides:
Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to require a determination that
an individual is entitled to disability benefits if evidence on the face of the
record shows that any prior determination of such entitlement to disability
benefits was either clearly erroneous at the time it was made or was
fraudulently obtained or if the individual is engaged in substantial gainful
activity.
Id.
137. Id. § 203(a)(1).
138. Id. § 304.
139. Id. § 201. In essence, the moratorium would prevent the Secretary from carry-
ing out the continuing eligibility review established by the 1980 amendment until the
criteria used in assessing mental disorders have been revised. Id.
140. Id. § 302.
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to either acquiesce in circuit courts' decisions or appeal to the United
States Supreme Court.14' Although such a statutory requirement would
hinder the Administration's ability to enforce uniform national guide-
lines for determining disability, allowing non-acquiescence results in
a double standard. In particular, only those who litigate enjoy the ad-
vantage of judicially created rules which are favorable to claimants,
such as the rule in Patti. Less favorable Social Security Administration
rules are determinative for those who do not go to court. 42 The fact
that the Act provides for judicial review of agency decisions suggests
that the Social Security Administration's non-acquiescence policy should
not be permitted. 43 The most serious objection to non-acquiescence,
141. Id. In particular, the Act would be amended to include the following:
COMPLIANCE WITH CERTAIN COURT ORDERS Sec. 234. In the case
of any decision rendered by a United States court of appeals which-
(1) involves interpretation of this title or any regulation prescribed
under this title;
(2) involves a case to which the Department of Health and Human
Services or any officer or employee thereof is a party; and
(3) requires that such department, or officer or employee thereof,
apply or carry out any provision, procedure, or policy under this title
with respect to any individual or circumstance in a manner which
varies from the manner in which such provision, procedure, or policy
is generally applied or carried out,
the Secretary of Health and Human Services, or such other officer or
employee of the Department of Health and Human Services as may be a
party to such case, or such other officer of the United States as may be ap-
propriate, shall acquiesce in such decision with respect to all beneficiaries
whose appeals would be within the jurisdiction of such court of appeals,
unless the Secretary makes a timely request for review of such decision by
the United States Supreme Court pursuant to section 1254 of title 28, United
States Code. If the United States Supreme Court denies such a request for
review, the Secretary shall so acquiesce in such decision on and after the
date of such denial of review until such time as the United States Supreme
Court rules on the issue involved and reaches a different result.
142. See J. MASHAW, C. GOETZ, F. GOODMAN, W. SCHWARTZ, P. VERKUIL & M. CAR-
ROW, SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS 107-15 (1978) [hereinafter cited as SOCIAL
SECURITY HEARINCS AND APPEALS]; The National Law Journal, Oct. 17, 1983, at 1, col.
1, at 26, col. 3.
143. SoCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS, supra note 142, at 112. With respect
to this judicial review argument, it has been suggested that:
If the role of the courts of appeals in social security matters were simply
to decide a small number of cases and provide guidance for the district courts
in a somewhat larger number of others, without any influence on the great
mass of cases decided by officials at the administrative level, there is serious
question whether that limited office would justify the labors of multi-member
panels of eminent judges.
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however, is "the unfairness in absolute terms of withholding from
citizens the rights to which the courts have held them entitled, forc-
ing them to pursue costly judicial remedies in order to cash those
rights in. ' 144
V. Conclusion
The circuits do not have a unified view of the burden of proof in
disability benefit termination proceedings. Recent district court cases,
however, suggest that the trend is toward a presumption of ongoing
disability. This approach imposes on the Secretary the burden of com-
ing forward with evidence of a change in the claimant's condition. 145
The ultimate burden of proof may nevertheless remain on the claimant.
Despite the Social Security Administration's attempt to encourage
Administrative Law Judges to circumvent the presumption of contin-
uing disability, such an approach is consistent with every circuit court
of appeals decision and with the purposes of the Act. 46 The presump-
tion approach is both inferable from the Secretary's Regulations and
required by considerations of fairness. Non-acquiescence in the judicial
requirements of the presumption standard imposes an unjustified burden
on the disabled.
Beth S. Glassman
144. Id.
145. This evidence may also consist of other limited and narrowly defined reasons
for terminating benefits. See supra text accompanying note 136.
146. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
1983]

